

Post-9/11 Security Policy and the Canadian State

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The events of September 11th, 2001 have presented significant challenges to global security. Suddenly the world, North America in particular, was trusted with the responsibility of securing citizens against pervasive and unobvious threats. Citizens began demanding their governments offer real policy solutions to address their security. The level of regional economic, societal and cultural ties that extends beyond national borders in North America, however, is unprecedented. People, goods and services move almost freely across many national borders, often several times a day. In this sense, 9/11 presents a paradox of globalization: the ability to facilitate ever increasing levels in the movement of goods and people while at the same time controlling transnational threats, whether it is terrorism or more conventional warfare. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that despite close cooperation between Canada and the US on issues of security post-9/11, Canada has continued to maintain a functional cooperation, not a formal integration in defence and security policy, which has allowed Canada to address the paradox of globalization while still retaining its sovereignty.

Introduction

The events of September 11th, 2001 have presented significant challenges to global security. Suddenly the world, North America in particular, was trusted with the responsibility of securing citizens against pervasive and unobvious threats. Citizens began demanding their governments offer real policy solutions to address their security. Whether security concerns post-9/11 are real or perceived is beyond the scope of this paper; what is of importance is the global policy environment such security measures must operate within. What makes security policy particularly difficult following 9/11 is the level of interdependence between sovereign states. The level of regional economic, societal and cultural ties that extends beyond national borders is unprecedented. People, goods and services move almost freely across many national borders, often several times a day. In this sense, 9/11 presents a paradox of globalization: the ability to facilitate ever increasing levels in the movement of goods and people while at the same time controlling

transnational threats, whether it is terrorism or more conventional warfare (Therrien, 2003, 63). Therrien's paradox then, offers an interesting framework from which to analyze the relationship between security policy and globalization post-9/11.

Interestingly, this paradox of globalization is particularly apparent in Canada-US relations. Following 9/11, Canada has worked closely with the US to assure Americans that Canadian security policy is committed to the cooperative security of the continent. Integrative pressures, most notably economic interdependence, have further enhanced regional pressures for the free flow of goods and people across the border. As noted by sociology scholar Saskia Sassen, "state sovereignty, nation-based citizenship...central banks and monetary policies – all of these institutions are being destabilized and even transformed as a result of globalization and integrative policy" (Sassen, 1996, xii).

Given the desire for an open border, in the post-9/11 world there has been increased pressure for a formally integrated security system between the US and Canada to address the paradox of globalization caused by 9/11. Canadian government officials however, continue to assert and defend Canadian sovereignty publically. This has created a perpetual push-and-pull between separation from and integration with the US (Roach, 2003, 167). If Sassen is correct that the sovereignty of nation states is being eroded, Canadian security policy post-9/11 provides an interesting case study with which to view tensions between formal integration and Canadian sovereignty. It is the purpose of this paper to argue that despite close cooperation between Canada and the US on issues of security post-9/11, Canada has continued to maintain a functional cooperation, not a formal integration in defence policy, which has allowed Canada to address the paradox of globalization noted by Therrien while still retaining its sovereignty.

The paper will begin by offering a brief background of the paradox of globalization within the context of Canada-US bilateral relations. Focussing primarily on trade policy, it will be shown that the level of economic integration between the two countries is quite high. This highlights the difficulty of an autonomous Canadian security policy by recognizing that other factors have strong influences on the formation of defence policy. Following a

brief contextual background, key joint-security initiatives between Canada and the US will be analyzed for their level of formal integration through joint-operations between the two countries. While several initiatives exist with varying levels of cooperation, the case studies of the “Smart Border” Declaration and Northern Command will be examined because of their direct relation to 9/11. It will also be shown that aside from a lack of formal integration in security policy within key joint-initiatives following 9/11, there are a number of challenges to any type of formal integration between the two countries. Despite Sassen’s insistence that globalizing forces are eroding national sovereignty, formidable resistance can be seen both in Canada and the US to an integrated security policy. Finally, upon clarifying the current bi-lateral security relationship as one of functional cooperation, next steps will be presented for future research and discussion.

Background – The Paradox of Geographical Proximity

The Canada-US border is one of the longest and most important border crossings in the world. It consists of 130 land crossings along the longest unfortified boundary in the world at 8,890km. Two hundred million crossings take place every year, and traffic is expected to grow at a rate of 10% annually over the next decade (Therrien, 2003, 60-61). Given the open nature of the shared border, there had been increasing pressure for both countries to work collaboratively to ensure the negative effects of tighter security policy do not spill over into more restricted travel of goods and services. As noted by Canada-US relations expert Donald Cuccioletta, it may be that Canada ultimately has a choice. If Canada seeks to retain a national security policy it may jeopardize its prosperity if the US decides that Canada’s border policies present unacceptable risk to American security. On the other hand, if Canada takes a more domestic or even widely international approach to security, it may be that Canada preserves its sovereignty from pressures of formal integration with the US (Cuccioletta, 2003, 141).

Prior to an examination of security policy, then, it is important to outline why Therrien’s paradox is particularly apparent in the Canadian context. One of the main factors, separate from security policy, that enhances the paradox is the level of trade between Canada and the US. Drawing on the work of Sassen, it could be that the interdependence

in trade could be creating a policy environment that is not only conducive to, but supporting the formal integration of border security. In this sense, this section will aim to set the agenda of some of the key border issues that must be addressed aside from security.

Trade

Economically, the volume of two-way trade between Canada and the US is unprecedented. Together they form the largest trading dyad in the world (Nevitte, 1996, 14). Importantly, even prior to 9/11, trade policy has been a central concern for Canadian officials. As noted by Professor of political science within the Canadian-American Center at the University of Maine, Howard Cody, “even before September 11, the security of trade and investment was already trumping Canadian policymakers’ other concerns” (Cody, 2003, 9). Trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) increased by 95% from 1993 to 2001, with only \$15 billion of the \$580 billion in North American trade going to Mexico (Cody, 2003, 9). In this sense, the US represents by far Canada’s largest trading partner and source of economic growth.

This dependence of Canada on the US for economic growth is important to any analysis of formal security policy integration between the two countries. Even prior to 9/11, the importance of keeping goods and people flowing freely over the border was vital to Canadian prosperity. Although \$1.2 billion worth of goods were crossing the border every day prior to 9/11 (Therrien, 2003, 60-61), asymmetries existed in the trading relationship. Canada’s exports to the US accounted for 86% of Canada’s global exports at the time, whereas US exports to Canada accounted for only 25% of America’s total exports . Moreover, Canadian exports to the US accounted for 37% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2000, whereas US exports to Canada accounted for only 2.4% of US GDP (Lubin, 2003, 26). This demonstrates a profound asymmetry in the trading relationship between the two countries. Canada, then, has the most to lose if the free flow of goods and services was restricted at the border. This can clearly be observed in the trade data on September 11, 2001.

With the closing of the Canada-US border for twenty-four hours due to security concerns after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, cross-border trade came to a halt. Although the impacts on trade for that day are obvious, closing the border for even twenty-four hours had significant effects on the Canadian economy. Given the open nature of the border, Canada and the US depend on what is called just in time production. That is, since goods can flow freely across the border, many goods are produced just prior to consumption. This decreases the need for inventories and therefore reduces costs to firms. Since much of the manufacturing sector in Canada is built around just in time production, some Canadian firms had to quickly cut output because a tight border meant there was nowhere for production to go.

Such cuts are most apparent in the auto industry. For example, between September and October of 2001, Canada was forced to produce 47,000 fewer cars because of border closures and slowdowns, compared to 153,000 in the US (Roach, 2003, 135-6). Although the US had a larger overall reduction, the impact on Canada was much higher because Canada's auto industry is much smaller. Therefore, the events of 9/11 demonstrate how significant an impact changes in border policy can have on key sectors of Canadian economic output.

Canada also experienced some longer-term consequences of the US reformulating border security following the events of 9/11, particularly related to transportation. Tighter border checks caused large backups in the transportation of goods across the border. Between October 2001 and December 2005, George Tanguay and Marie-Christine Therrien of the University of Toronto conducted a study of the impacts of 9/11 on shipping costs to Canadian freighters. They found that during that time, 43% of transporters noted a higher average cost of 2.65% above inflation associated with freight (Tanguay and Therrien, 2005, 10). Moreover, they found that the average number of people crossing the border each day fell from approximately 200,000 people to nearly 160,000 per day (Tanguay and Therrien, 2005, 13). Although the exact impact of these rising costs of freight and restricted flow of people on the Canadian economy is unknown, it is evident that this restricts tourism and business transactions in a way that negatively affects

domestic GDP.

Given the importance of an open border to the Canadian economy even prior to September 11, 2001, the events of 9/11 have only increased pressure on Canadian and American agencies regulating the cross-border flow of goods and people to cooperate. Canadian officials, then, must always “look at border issues through the lens of trade” (Lubin, 2003, 26). If economic pressures are pushing for an integrated border policy to facilitate the free flow of goods and people, then under Therrien’s paradox of globalization the best way to ensure this may be an integrated security policy. While a normative analysis of formal border integration is beyond the scope of this paper, the impact of 9/11 on trade has prompted key sub-national agencies to advocate for such a policy. Key economic figures in Canada, such as Tom D’Aquino of the Canada Council of Chief Executives, have been lobbying government for a more integrated border security policy with the US to facilitate commerce (Cody, 2003, 10). Perhaps most notably, however, were the remarks by David O’Brien, CEO of Canadian Pacific, following the events of September 11, 2001. Four days after 9/11, O’Brien was quoted as saying:

“Canada will have to adopt US-style border security policies if it doesn’t want the border between the two countries to become almost impossible to cross... we have to make North America secure from the outside. We’re going to lose increasingly our sovereignty, but necessarily so” (Roach, 2003, 135).

This is important because it highlights the relation between trade and border security. Canadian anxieties about cooperation with American efforts to create a continental security framework seem to be driven by economic concerns about keeping the border open for free trade between the two countries. To reinforce the point further, political scientist Karl Deutsch further tightens the relation between the pressures of trade and formal integration of the border. By examining European integration through the European Union, Deutsch notes that high levels of cross-border transactions, such as the movement of people, goods and communication, encourage greater similarities in what he calls “main values” (Nevitte, 1996, 15). That is, common values are established through trade because similar needs are mutually reinforcing. Economic cooperation requires coordinated decision-making, and hence is conducive to greater integration over all policies (Nevitte, 1996, 15). If the strong trade relations between the two countries can

prompt greater formal integration, including policies related to security, what then has Canada's position towards these pressures been?

Canadian Security Policy in Context

In 1951 Lester B. Pearson stated that the US is now the “dominating world power on the side of freedom. Our preoccupation is no longer whether the US will discharge her international responsibilities, but how the rest of us will be involved” (Cody, 2003, 4). Operating within the shadow of great powers and sharing the continent is nothing new for Canada. Scholars such as Stephen Clarkson argue that in light of the sovereign modern state's evolution, Canada has only been modern in theory. Canada's economy was linked by imperial control to Britain and France, and now it may be argued to the US. Canada has always required assistance in defending its borders, whether it is the British in the War of 1812, or the US during the Cold War. Even Canada's culture is largely generated from outside its borders. In this sense, according to Clarkson, “Canada may have been postmodern long before modernism” (Clarkson, 2002, 16). It may be that Canada is a prime example of Sassen's globalization as undermining state sovereignty in that Canada was “globalized” even prior to 1867. Sovereignty, at least in the Canadian sense, may be a myth beyond the political sense of bureaucracy, courts and the constitution.

The challenges to Canadian sovereignty posed by Sassen and Clarkson are not questions about whether the geographical space now known as Canada would survive (Clarkson, 2002, 11). Obviously, it would remain on the map, stretching over a vast terrain from the American border up to the North Pole. Their arguments do, however, call into question the ability of Canada to exercise its sovereignty. For the purposes of this paper, this critique is particularly challenging given the post-9/11 globalization paradox within which Canada has found itself. If it is the case that Canadian sovereignty is but an illusion wrapped in domestic political institutions, Canadian security policy may largely already be formulated outside of Canada.

It is important to remember that dependence does not entail integration. Although Canada has a complex history in its dependence for security from other sovereign states,

there is nothing particularly unique about it. Many countries have relied on others at some time for assisted protection, including other commonwealth countries such as Australia and South Africa.

More contemporary, through international security pacts such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or to a lesser extent the European Union (EU), these supranational bodies represent multi-state agreements on security. While complicating domestic security policy by forcing state governments to, at the very least, acknowledge deliberative commitments within these international bodies, states still have the sovereign authority to declare their own security policy. For example, although the spring 2011 intervention in Lybia was sanctioned by the United Nations (UN) and military responsibilities transferred to NATO, Germany abstained from participation despite being a NATO member. If faced with a threat to its border security from a foreign military, however, it would surely rely upon NATO and the EU for assistance. In this sense, dependence on foreign states, particularly within complex international security pacts, cannot simply be regarded as undermining state sovereignty. Rather, it is a recognition that states now operate in a highly complex world; one which requires a tremendous amount of cooperation and coordination to mitigate risks from foreign threats. Shifting back to the Canadian context, it is evident that Canada has one of the largest, most difficult borders to secure from external threats. With three oceans, a large airspace, and a small population, Canada cannot defend its borders alone (McLelland, 2003, 169-170). The question that remains, however, is whether cooperative security measures between the US and Canada are a form of structural integration, or functional cooperation.

Historically, Canadian policymakers have had mixed feelings about major directional shifts in US security policy. Canadian reaction and policy responses to American foreign policy or security initiatives have often been irregular. That is, if it were the case that Canada has been moving toward formal security integration for quite some time, it would likely be expected that there would be some level of consistency in support of a joint-security policy. This simply is not the case. There has long been a debate between those

Canadians that argue that Canada should maintain an independent reputation in matters of security, who Howard Cody refers to as “nationalists”, and “continentalists”; those that support stronger integration of defence and border services to enhance economic productivity (Cody, 2003, 5). Likewise, scholars are predictably divided. They range from historians such as Jack Granastein, who suggest the need for an integrated continental security policy, to an array of critics such as Michael Hart who criticize almost any accommodation of US defence policy (Ross and Hira, 2008, 11).

In reality, Canada's official position is somewhere in the middle. It is not difficult to conjure up examples for either the continentalists or nationalists. Continentalists can draw on examples such as the creation of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) in 1957 which gave a joint command to the aerial defence of the country, or the building of the Alaska Highway in 1942 which serves as a US military transit line through Canada territory (Brown, 2005, 38). Nationalists, on the other hand, can point to Canada's refusal to support American missions abroad such as Vietnam or Iraq, or the rejection of a continental Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) shield to defend against a possible Soviet nuclear attack during the Cold War (Ross and Hira, 2008, 163). Historically, then, there has never been a clear indication that Canada has been moving toward the adoption of a fully integrated security policy with the US.

As has been shown, then, Canadian integration and separation from US security policy represent the extremes of possibilities. Although it is difficult to properly gauge what a “tipping point” Canadian security policy would be toward either extreme, it is possible that 9/11 may have pushed Canada in one direction or the other. In this sense, the importance of 9/11 in relation to the paradox of globalization noted by Therrien cannot be dismissed. The next section will provide a brief overview of a couple of the key border security policies in response to 9/11, and whether they seem to take the form of structural integration, formal divergence, or a third reality, what this paper will refer to as functional cooperation with the US.

Case Studies

Regarding issues of border security, there has been much congruence in the two national approaches post-9/11. Both Canada and the US have expressed their commitment to effectively tackling the paradox of globalization: facilitating the free flow of goods and services across the border while at the same time making it secure from external threats. To this end, both Canada and the US are committed to a secure yet economically viable border security framework. Despite this common objective though, divergences in policy still remain over key issues of sovereignty (Ross and Hira, 2008, 3). It need not be the case, however, that Canadian security policy in the post-9/11 context be framed as a dichotomy between continentalist integration with and nationalist separation from the US. Drawing on the work of Stephen Clarkson, there is a difference between structural and functional workings of the Canadian state (Clarkson, 2002, 12). It is possible that Canada maintain a strong sense of autonomous sovereignty in the structural sense of respected borders and an independent voice through Canada's governing institutions and agencies, while at the same time moving toward greater functional cooperation that achieves mutually beneficial outcomes for both countries.

Although a connection between these two possibilities in the sense that increased functional cooperation leads to structural integration cannot be ruled out in the long-term, there seems to be very little evidence that Canadian security policy in the post-9/11 context is anything but functional cooperation. As noted poignantly by Stephen Clarkson, "it seems like functional relations are changing, not so much structural" (Clarkson, 2002, 12). In this sense, despite pressures associated with the aforementioned paradox of globalization, at this time Canadian sovereignty does not appear to be in jeopardy. Below are two case studies of Canada's security policy response to 9/11 which highlight a move toward deepening cooperation, not integration. They include the "Smart Border" Declaration and Northern Command.

"Smart Border" Declaration

Following the events of 9/11, American fears of an unsecure border prompted almost immediate dialogue with their Canadian counterparts on how best to secure not

only the Canada-US border, but North America as a whole. The focus of US border security changed in the wake of 9/11. The Border Security website of the US Customs and Border Protection Agency in October, 2001 stated that “US Customs and Border Protection’s top priority is to keep terrorists and their weapons from entering the United States” (Globerman and Storer, 2008, 19). This served to bolster support for increased integration between the two countries through formal mechanisms of joint-security. A number of prominent American and Canadian military analysts were urging Canada to integrate its security policy with the US so that cross-jurisdictional security issues could be addressed by both countries (Roach, 2003, 141). Policies being floated around included a single border agency for increased efficiency, as well as allowing US federal agencies to operate within Canadian jurisdiction given the occurrence of a threat of “high enough proportion” (Hart, 2008, 202).

In reality, however, discussions between the two governments led to the adoption of a much more moderate joint-policy framework. Born out of careful negotiations between then Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs John Manley and American Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge, the “Smart Border” declaration outlined a cooperative compromise. Signed in December 2001, the “Smart Border” declaration focussed on steps to allow low-risk people and goods to cross the border more efficiently, while at the same time increasing the security of both countries (Byrne, 2010, 170).

It is important to note exactly what type of threats the agreement was trying to address. Unlike historical precedents, 9/11 represented a new and much more complex type of threat to the security of North America. Preventative security measures to mitigate threats from terrorists depend on the proper screening of persons and goods crossing borders, not military prowess. Instead, the “Smart Border” declaration represented a thirty-point action plan organized into four main categories: 1) the secure flow of people; 2) the secure flow of goods; 3) secure infrastructure; and coordination and information sharing in support of the declaration’s objectives (Globerman and Storer, 2008, 4). Aside from the cooperative sharing of information between police, health and safety and border agencies, or increased cooperation of the maintenance of border crossings,

no framework was established for any formal integration between the two countries. Therefore, Canada's commitments under the "Smart Border" declaration only enhance cooperation between separate agencies such as the RCMP and the American Border Protection Agency.

In this sense, Canadian officials made it clear that they would be open to better utilizing technology and information sharing to ease border flows. By better utilizing techniques of risk assessment, licensing and scanning equipment, both countries were able to work cooperatively to promote the flow of goods and people while improving the ability to intercept security threats. Importantly, for the purposes of this paper however, Canadian officials quickly rejected the possibility of integrating within the Patriot Act in the US (Therrien, 2003, 141). That is, Canadian officials ruled out US counterterrorism surveillance within Canadian jurisdiction. As noted by John Doherty, spokesman for the RCMP in 2001, "Canadian security will be determined by Canadians working within Canadian institutions" (Cuccioletta, 2003, 47). While Canadian officials were willing to increase cooperative practices to enhance security in both countries, then, they were unwilling to formally integrate those agencies responsible for border security with the US. All things considered, however, the "Smart Border" declaration has largely been considered effective. Although every policy has its critics, the May 2003 State Department Annual Report on Patterns of Global Terrorism rated Canada as an "excellent model in establishing a cooperative framework of security" (Cody, 2003, 8-9). The report noted that Objective 2.1 of the declaration relating to the monitoring and sharing of information regarding potential threats was particularly effective (Ross and Hira, 2008, 19). Although a detailed discussion of the impacts of the "Smart Border" declaration is beyond the scope of this paper, the report demonstrates the adoption of a middle approach by Canadian officials to border security. Despite the economic pressures noted in Therrien's paradox of globalization, Canadian policymakers were able to enhance cooperation in the functional workings of border security between the two countries, while still maintaining structural autonomy of Canada's border agencies.

Northern Command

Following the events of 9/11, officials within the American Department of Defence (DOD) were calling for an expansion of NORAD into a larger continental framework known as Northern Command. In October 2002, the American government began preliminary talks with its Canadian counterpart to mandate this new organization. Northern Command was to be a joint-command in defence by air, land and sea of all North America (excluding Mexico), including responsibility for working with civil authorities in the event of another September 11 (Cohen, 2003, 26). Northern Command, then, if adopted by Canada, would signal formal integration in security policy with the US.

Pressure was certainly mounting for formal integration by 2002, perhaps even more strongly since the “Smart Border” declaration shut US authorities out of Canadian jurisdiction. Reasons given for accommodating the US over Northern Command centred on NORAD and the important other side of the paradox of globalization, trade. Firstly, beginning with NORAD, DOD authorities argued that “Canadian opposition to US plans could lead to a severe marginalization or even termination of NORAD” (Ross and Hira, 2008, 18). This could have highly adverse and expensive implications for Canadian authorities to understand what is happening not only in times of conflict, but in peacetime since it is used to monitor civilian aircraft as well. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, American diplomats noted that Canadian acquiescence to Northern Command might help to soften congressional attitudes on protectionist measures for Canadian goods such as softwood lumber (Ross and Hira, 2008, 18). In this sense, American officials attempted to pit the pressures of the two sides of the paradox against each other in the hopes that Canadian policymakers would acquiesce for economic gains.

Then Canadian Defence Minister John McCallum rejected the idea of Canada joining Northern Command on the basis that “Canadian sovereignty would be threatened” (Ross and Hira, 2008, 18). McCallum noted that such a functional integration would deny Canada autonomous decision-making, both in times of threat and peace. McCallum went on to note that “such a violation of sovereignty would deny the principles to which

defence of the country [Canada] are deemed worthy” (Roach, 2003, 155). In the case of Northern Command, then, Canadian authorities took a firm line against any type of formal integration. Economic and security pressures for an open border, then, were insufficient in prompting Canada to accept Northern Command.

It is worth noting, however, that McCallum did agree to a joint-planning group that will help increase readiness in both countries should there be another terrorist attack. The group is composed of fifteen senior Canadian military officials and fifteen senior American officials who meet bi-annually. This is important because the Defence Minister correctly points out that “neither terrorists nor biological agents have respect for the 49th parallel” (Roach, 2003, 155). In this way Minister McCallum worked to establish a functional cooperation between the two countries to increase preparedness. There is no reason to believe that such talks are anything more than cooperative efforts between allied states. Even Minister McCallum stated “it is only prudent, only common sense, for Canadians and Americans to plan together to protect the lives of our citizens” (Roach, 2003, 155). This is particularly insightful because it highlights the often overly complex analysis provided on this subject. Prudent planning and discussions between various levels of government through a functional cooperation can be a rewarding process, while still respecting the tenets of sovereignty as outlined in the Canadian constitution. As has been shown through these two case studies, Canadian sovereignty remains alive and well despite increased functional cooperation between the two states.

Other Challenges

Aside from the case studies addressed in this paper, there remain key considerations that cast doubt on the possibility of any formal integration within security policy between the two countries in the near future. To provide a more comprehensive analysis, each factor which will briefly be presented below.

1. Ad-hoc Coordination

The events of 9/11 required a rethinking of both domestic and international institutions in terms of the nexus between security and economics. Concerns for domestic civil

society protection, sovereignty, and an independent foreign policy must be balanced with concerns regarding terrorism, smooth economic commerce, and security cooperation. Thus far, however institutional changes have included ad hoc efforts with no particular level of coordination between Canada and the US, despite the new reality of security-economic linkages (Ross and Hira, 2008, 26). For example, although some American and Canadian policymakers have urged for greater integration, Canada has had difficulty centralizing even its own agencies under Public Safety Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), similar to the Department of Homeland Security in the US. PSEPC is a coordinating agency covering a wide array of different partners, from the RCMP to emergency management of health threats. In practice, PSEPC has had great difficulty centralizing long-standing agencies with a “strong sense of bureaucratic turf protection” (Ross and Hira, 2008, 26-27). In this sense, the idea that Canadian and US agencies can integrate, at least in the short-term, is problematic given Canada is having difficulty centralizing them domestically.

2. Regionalism

While the term regionalism is very broad, for the purposes of this paper it refers to the difficulty in facilitating cross-national security integration given local resistance. Simply put, the ability to establish a unified position within the Canadian Federation on integration with the US would be extremely difficult. Although the US currently serves as Canada’s most important ally and reference society, as noted by Neil Nevitte, “for generations, the one consistent thread within Canada’s policy toward the US was resistance to judicious management of the forces of continental integration” (Nevitte, 1996, 13). Canada was established in a decentralized fashion, with regional concerns offering a rather strong resistance to any form of continental integration.

The Canadian political context, then, provides a unique challenge to integration. Provincial-Federal relations in Canada make the centralization of authority in Canada difficult, let alone with another country. For example, Alberta’s independent concerns over the oil sands, in combination with the inherent split with Francophone Quebec, prevented the development of a consistent national trade and investment strategy in the early

2000's (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2002, 3). In this sense, although national security is within federal jurisdiction, it is unlikely that any formal integration of security policy with the US would be met with anything less than intense provincial scrutiny as it would undermine not only federal autonomy, but provincial as well. Regardless of constitutional divisions of power, democratic polities in North America have come to speak abroad with regionally nuanced voices (Lubin, 2003, 27). Consequently, as practitioners of democracy and federalism, Canadian and American officials would have a particularly difficult job aligning the various positions held by states and provinces within North America.

3. Political Resistance

By political resistance, here it is meant as the opposition to the integration of security policy as presented by Canadian political figures following 9/11. When asked about the possibility of a more integrated security framework with the US Jean Chretien curtly replied "the laws and policies of Canada will be passed by the Parliament of Canada" (Roach, 2003, 135). Such sentiments were further reiterated by then Foreign Affairs Minister Bill Graham through his criticism of American border personnel fingerprinting Arab-born Canadians crossing the border.

Likewise, the idea of creating a joint-security framework was met with scepticism by the Canadian Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. In comparing it to the European Union, the Committee noted a stark difference in the North American context. Given the large borderlands surrounding North America and the large imbalance of military prowess between the US and Canada, the Committee argued that a joint-security initiative would "almost certainly involve a greater sacrifice of policy sovereignty by Canada" (Globerman and Storer, 2008, 23). In this way, the importance of individuals working in government appearing strong on Canadian sovereignty is important. Canadian political figures must constantly espouse respect for the institutions for which they are responsible. Further integration with a foreign country, then, is complicated by pressures of sovereignty on individuals operating within the Canadian political system.

4. Public Opinion and “Canadian Values”

By 2002 most Canadians were becoming uncomfortable with the implications of a strategy that would tie Canada’s visa and border policies to American policies in a joint security perimeter. In a February 2002 poll conducted by Simon Fraser University, 85% of Canadians said they would be unwilling to trade sovereignty for security by joining a North American security perimeter (Roach, 2003, 139). This may represent one of the most difficult challenges to any formal integration in security policy. Without public support, continentalist legislation will be met with harsh criticism from the public not only because it challenges Canadian sovereignty, but because it calls into question Canadian values that are often deemed as separate from the US. When Minister Bill Graham was asked whether American security policy may amount to racial profiling of Canadian minorities, he responded “a Muslim is a terrorist? What’s that? That’s clearly not the Canadian way and I have to look for answers here” (Roach, 2003, 139-140). This reinforces Canadian values as somehow more inclusive and therefore distinct from American values. Whether real or perceived, they present a formidable challenge to enhanced integration. The Canadian public seems reluctant to support such an initiative.

To reinforce the point, the perception of Canadian values being inclusive of sub-national narratives is important. When debating support for Bill C-36, Canada’s anti-terrorism law, in 2002, sub-national groups came to speak with competing narratives to proposals for restricted civil liberties in the event of a terrorist threat. Through anecdotes and personal narratives, groups such as Arab Canadians, Muslim Canadians, the Canadian Civil Liberties Organization and even the Canadian Council for Churches called into question the aims of Bill-36 as counter to Canadian values of multiculturalism and respect for sub-national groups (Byrne, 2010, 170).

While not able to stop the law from passing, pressure from sub-national groups did produce some significant amendments. Upon listening to such counter-narratives, then Privacy Commissioner George Radwanski asserted that it “simply not be acceptable... for Bill C-36 to contain provisions that would strip Canadians of all legally assured privacy rights...people who come to Canada come because of its freedoms and diversity of

society. We have to make sure these strengths are protected” (Roach, 2003, 64). In the end, amendments were made to the Bill that changed the definition of terrorism, enacted a non-discrimination clause, and required Parliament to monitor the implementation of the Bill (Byrne, 2010, 170). Therefore, citizenry pressure for the maintenance of autonomous Canadian values may represent a formidable challenge to any continental security initiative. Security policy is no longer the sole domain of nation states. As nations become more complex, political institutions have had to contend with an evolving and engaging civil society (Cuccioletta, 2003, 55). Anti-globalization concerns from sub-national groups, whether they are ethnic organizations, trade unions, women’s groups or environmental groups, must now be taken into account when planning security policy.

5. Internationalism

Finally, it must be recognized that Canadian security policy operates within a much larger context than simply North America. Canadian security policy is complicated by international commitments and relations with a variety of sub-national, national and supranational organizations and governments. While Canada may have a functional cooperation with the US on border security, so too does it have security commitments through international agreements such as the Nuclear-Proliferation Treaty, to which the US is not a part.

Perhaps most notably, however, is Canada’s position on Arctic sovereignty. Although being part of the North American border perimeter, Canada has made it very clear that the Arctic is sovereign Canadian territory. In fact, Canada is going to great lengths to enforce this by spending \$3 billion on military ports and icebreakers in Resolute Bay and Nanivik (Ross and Hira, 2008, 25-26). Despite American pressures to integrate the Arctic into a continental security perimeter, or at the very least leave it navigable to international shipping, Canada has appealed to international bodies such as the Arctic Council to discuss issues related to Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. In this sense, Canadian security policy does not in any way center solely around the US. There are a myriad of concerns and international commitments to which Canada is a part that detract from the importance and feasibility of establishing an integrated security policy with the US.

Moving Forward

Moving forward, our starting point in attempting to understand Canadian security policy under globalization should be to understand the changing quality of all states over time. States are dynamic – their functions and cooperative partnerships change and grow over time (Clarkson, 2002, 14-15). In this way, it may be that in the future Canada does move toward closer integration of security policy with the US, or perhaps not. Anything that far off, however, is purely speculation. For now, and into the foreseeable future, Canada has been enhancing a functional cooperation with the US with regard to security policy. This has served to at least adequately address Therrien's paradox of globalization, while at the same time maintain Canadian sovereignty and autonomy over Canadian security policy in light of pressures for formal integration.

Although the scope for cooperative action stretches across the full range of issues that threaten the security and well-being of Canadians, it is most crucial in the area of immediate security threats: terrorism and rogue states. In the post-9/11 world, Canada has two choices: it can react defensively, in an effort to project difference and independence and thus fuel American concerns, or it can engage the United States, putting forward initiatives and ideas of its own to demonstrate that Canada is a strong and reliable partner (Hart, 2008, 263). Given the trend toward functional cooperation demonstrated in this paper, it would seem Canada should choose the later.

It is important to note, however, that Canada must remain vigilant by appealing to and engaging international laws and allies to maintain a voice that commands respect when negotiating joint-security policy. As noted by Professor of political science at the University of British Columbia Michael Hart, "sustaining Canada's standing and interest requires active and astute management", and, because of the asymmetries in the relationship, "it is Canada that has the most to gain from getting it right – and the most to lose from getting it wrong" (Hart, 2008, 202).

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paradox of globalization as outlined by Therrien has and will continue to put great pressure on Canada to integrate its security policy with the US. Despite possible erosions of sovereignty noted by Sassen in other ways, particularly economically and technologically, Canadian security policy seems to be striking a balance between integration with and separation from the US. Through what this paper has referred to as functional cooperation, Canada has been able to enhance collaboration with the US over issues of security, while still retaining autonomy in decision-making and security policy formation. While the future of Canada-US security policy remains uncertain, given the challenges to formal integration noted in this paper, it seems unlikely that Canada is moving toward a more formal integration of security with the US anytime soon.

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