

Income Inequality: Framing the Issue

Maria Edwards

University of Toronto

Maria Edwards is in her second year of the Master of Public Policy program at University of Toronto's School of Public Policy and Governance. She comes most recently from Ottawa, where she completed a yearlong internship in the International Affairs, Trade and Finance Division of the Library of Parliament, drafting briefing notes, research reports, and other items for parliamentarians on a myriad of topics. Maria holds an International Bachelor of Business Administration with Honours from the Schulich School of Business at York University, the highlight of which was an exchange semester in France.

Income inequality has risen rapidly in Canada in the past decade. The growing income gap in Canadian society has implications not only for the country's economic efficiency and social cohesion, but also for the nature of Canada's policy making. This paper outlines why income inequality matters for Canadian policy makers and seeks to explain some of the underlying causes for why income inequality is not yet a policy priority. It also provides an overview of the global debate surrounding the framing of this issue and explores the role of think tanks and the media in driving political action on income inequality.

Introduction

The Occupy movement spread from New York to cities across the United States and the globe in the span of a month, propelled by the rallying cry of "We are the 99 per cent." Catchy yet vague, this slogan underpins the realities of growing income inequality, or the extent to which income is distributed unevenly in society. While income distribution is more unequal in the United States than in Canada, after 20 years of continuous decline both inequality and poverty rates have risen rapidly in Canada in the past decade, now reaching levels above the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) average. Perhaps even more starkly, income inequality, on both a pre- and after-tax basis, actually increased faster in Canada than in the United States between 1995 and 2005, according to an OECD study released in 2008 (Yakabuski 2009). Income inequality is a problem in Canada and it is quickly getting worse.

In the wake of the Occupy movement, high-ranking Canadian officials, such as Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney and Finance Minister Jim Flaherty have acknowledged that income distribution is a growing problem in Canada. However, there continues to be a lack of consensus among opinion leaders and policy makers about the severity of the problem, its causes and consequences, and the recommended solutions. The

income gap is also a complex policy problem in that it is hard to isolate from other social problems. In particular, the challenge lies in differentiating income inequality from poverty. After all, while solutions directed towards addressing poverty may help the low-end of the income distribution move up, they ignore the ballooning of incomes at the very top and the shrinking middle-class. Engaging in a discussion on income inequality also necessitates a discussion on taxes, which has largely become a unpleasant word in Canadian political discourse. Irrespective of the difficulties in effectively framing the issue, this paper argues that not addressing income inequality will not only have an impact on Canada's social cohesion and economic efficiency, but will also have long-term implications on the nature of Canadian policy making.

This paper shall focus on defining why income inequality should be a priority policy issue, in addition to examining why it has not been a priority to date. The role of the media and think tanks in the issue-framing process is explored, along with whether the issue has neared a tipping point for political action in recent elections.

Why Does Income Inequality Matter?

A common yardstick for income inequality is the Gini coefficient, which ranges on a scale 0 (meaning "equality:" where "everyone has the same income:") to 1 (meaning great inequality: "one person has all the income"). According to the OECD, Canada has seen a "significant increase" in its Gini coefficient, rising to 0.317 in the mid-200s from 0.301 in 2000 (OECD 2008). This is above the OECD average of 0.311, but still below the United States and the United Kingdom (OECD 2008). Another common method for measuring income inequality is to look at trends in real household income by quintiles, as well as by tracking the gains and losses of income shares by income quintiles. There is also the question of whether before- or after-tax income should be considered, or even income in terms of purchasing power parity.

Whichever indicator is used, they all point to one conclusion: the promise of meritocracy – get an education, work hard, and you will get ahead on your own merit – is breaking down in Canada. Although this generation of workers is better educated than any

previous generation, and are working more hours per household, the middle class has failed to see any significant gains from a decade of the most sustained economic expansion since the 1960s. In fact, the median pre-tax incomes in 2007 were just \$55,000 in inflation-adjusted dollars, essentially the same as in 1980 (Yalnizyan 2010b). It now takes two wage earners to get into and stay in the middle class, with the average couple raising children now working 200 more hours a year than they were a decade ago. This squeeze on the middle class is particularly problematic since it is considered to be the “conveyor belt of ideas, social norms, cultural expectations” (Yalnizyan 2009).

Indeed, according to the Conference Board of Canada, in the past decade, the majority of wage gains accrued to Canadians at the top of the income distribution, just as in the United States (Conference Board of Canada 2011). Michael Veall and Emmanuel Saez have used tax data going back to the 1920s to show the concentration of incomes at the top end of the spectrum, with the top 1 per cent of Canadians doubling their share of wages, from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of all wages since the early 1980s (Saez and Veall 2005). In fact, fully one-third of all income growth in Canada in the past 20 years went to the richest 1 per cent of Canadians (Yalnizyan 2010a, 3). In conducting an overview of the compensation of Canada’s top 100 CEOs, Hugh Mackenzie found that they made an average of over \$6.5 million in 2009, or 155 times more than the average Canadian worker’s income of less than \$43,000 that year (Mackenzie 2011, 3).

Whereas the 100 top-paid CEOs will earn a year’s worth of minimum wage work by 3:15 p.m. daily, the bottom half of the population of non-elderly Canadians are living on lower after-tax incomes today than their counterparts in the late 1970s (Mackenzie 2011, 3). What makes addressing this trend even more difficult is the fact that the greatest inequality is concentrated in Canada’s largest cities. For example, while in 1990 Canada’s Gini coefficient was 0.28, only slightly less than the 0.299 for Toronto, by 2006 the Gini of Canada’s largest city was at 0.452, or 42 per cent higher than Canada’s overall level (Miller 2010, 2). Although Canadian municipalities have thus far avoided the creation of ghettos that exist in many major American cities, David Hulchanski (2010) has shown that income polarization manifests itself in spatial polarization over time.

Polarization of incomes erodes social cohesion and makes it more difficult for policy makers to identify a shared public purpose. In a the January/February 2011 cover story for *The Atlantic* magazine, the global editor at large for Reuters, Chrystia Freeland, posits that the very rich today are different from the very rich of yesterday. In particular, they have an “ambivalent attitude” towards their countrymen back home and have more in common with other members of the super-elite (Freeland 2011, 2). The emerging plutocracy, which is increasingly composed of individuals who acquired their wealth through personal achievement rather than through inheritance, thus has little appetite for the trials of North America’s working and middle classes. It only matters that the global community they live in is thriving. One CEO quoted in the article epitomized this sentiment, saying “It is a problem for America, but it is not necessarily a problem for American business...American businesses will adapt” (Freeland 2011, 10). Back in Canada, Yalnizyan (2009) has suggested that if the richest of our society begin to feel as if they are not in the same boat as the rest of us, there will be too much temptation for them to shift the societal costs and risks, be they the risk of aging or joblessness, to those who are less able to shoulder the burden. A prominent American economist, Joseph Stiglitz (2011), has also been concerned that growing income inequality means an increasing reluctance by the wealthy to spend money on common needs and a heightened resistance to a strong government that could act to re-adjust the balance of wealth.

Even those that believe that concerns over income inequality are overblown, such as American economist Tyler Cowen, agree that the temptation of the rich to pass on the risk to the rest of society – or to tap “a hole in the social till and [...] drink from it with a straw” - has dangerous implications (Cowen 2011, 7). Cowen suggests that the cause of income inequality at the top can be traced back to risk-taking behaviour in the financial sector, which is dangerous from an economic point of view because it distorts resource distribution and productivity (Cowen 2011, 7). Stiglitz agrees that growing inequality means that we are not using some of our labour force in the most productive way (Stiglitz 2011, 3). Moreover, he argues that the distortions that lead to income inequality undermine the efficiency of the economy by creating new distortions – such as the

disproportionate amount of talented young people who pursue careers in finance, due to the excessive rewards in this sector, rather than going into fields that would lead to a more productive and healthy economy (Stiglitz 2011, 3).

While the financial sector benefits from an influx of money during the boom years, even in the bust years, such as the 2007-2008 recession, the losses that result from the sector's risk-taking behaviour is borne by other parts of society in the form of bailouts and job losses. In other words, the financial sector, as it exists today, functions as a mechanism that widens the income gap (Cowen 2011; Stiglitz 2011). This gap, Nobel Laureate Michael Spence argues, is "socially and politically disruptive and can threaten support for the policies and public-sector investments that in part sustain growth" (Christensen 2009, 10).

In a 2009 Massey lecture, Armine Yalnizyan summarized the challenge that these effects of income inequality pose for policy makers:

"If only the top get ahead, while the middle are stagnant and the poor are losing ground, it becomes harder to define shared objectives, or to pursue goals that benefit the majority. Public policy becomes increasingly mired in negotiated deals with the most effective lobbyists. "

Although the increasing concentration of wealth at the top is not inevitable, "it is coming to be viewed as normal" (Yalnizyan 2011). Therefore, the longer this issue languishes in problem invisibility, the less likely it is that it will be addressed at all.

Underpinnings of Income Inequality

The amount of inequality that a society will tolerate before it is recognized as a problem can be traced back to its type of welfare stage regime. Looking beyond the welfare state as simply a range of policies targeted at improving social conditions through income transfers and social services, the broad view of the welfare state instead focuses on the macro-economic policies of capitalist society and the issues of employment and wages. According to Esping-Andersen (1990), capitalism brought about the commodification of labour and putting peoples' rights to survive outside of the market at risk. De-commodification, or the degree of market independence for an average worker, is thus

“a precondition for a tolerable level of individual welfare and security” (Esping-Andersen 1990, 37). Therefore, differences in welfare-state regimes reflect competing responses to the pressures of de-commodification and allow industrial economies to be divided into three types: Anglo-Saxon (e.g., Canada, U.S.), countries of Continental Europe (e.g., Germany, the Netherlands), and the Scandinavian/Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Finland. These categories are based on similarities in long-standing institutional and political traditions, as well as on broadly congruent patterns in the way families, markets, and states interact in the distribution of welfare.

In general, the level of de-commodification appears to parallel the extent of income inequality and relative low-income rates in the three country clusters. Anglo-Saxon countries tend to be the least de-commodifying, and generally have the highest relative low-income and inequality rates, whereas Scandinavian nations have the greatest level of de-commodification and the highest performance on the two indicators (Esping-Andersen 1990, 50; Picot and Myles 2005, 8-10). These differences are also indicative of the degree of income inequality that needs to be reached in a particular country before policy makers will recognize it as a problem. Scandinavian/Nordic countries promote the equality of status: all citizens have the same rights, regardless of class or market position. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon countries have means-tested benefits that are modest and are provided mainly to low-income dependents.

While Canada is classified within the Anglo-Saxon grouping of countries, empirical studies have shown that as compared to the United States and the United Kingdom, the country has a lower level of family income inequality and relative low-income rates, but significantly higher than those found in the European welfare states (Picot and Myles 2005, 27). However, it is important to keep in mind that Canada’s level of intergenerational income mobility has also been shown to be on par with the higher levels seen in the Nordic countries, indicating that it is less likely that Canadian children from low-income families will themselves be low-income as young adults (Picot and Myles 2005, 28).

Another reason why inequality has been allowed to grow without being recognized as a problem is due to the “marginal productivity theory,” long used by economists to justify disparity in incomes (Stiglitz 2011, 2). In essence, this theory associates higher incomes with higher productivity and a greater contribution to society. Although popular with the rich, Stiglitz points out that there has been little evidence to support this argument. After all, corporate executives who made massively negative contributions to their companies and society by helping bring about the recession still received bonuses. Moreover, as Mackenzie has pointed out, it is unlikely that Canada’s top CEOs are actually 155 times more productive than the average Canadian worker, although that is how much more they earn (Mackenzie 2011).

Finally, political realities and the nature of Canadian federalism have also limited recognition of income inequality as a pressing policy issue. Keith Banting has contended that the outcomes of the restructuring of programs under exclusively federal jurisdiction, such as Employment Insurance (EI) and pensions, tend to “faithfully reflect the electoral importance of different client groups,” with pensioners clearly emerging as the most powerful voting bloc (Banting 2007, 151). In contrast, the restructuring of child benefits has been more extensive, and EI has suffered the deepest and most frequent cuts from the federal government. The “virtually total abandonment of social assistance by the federal government” again highlights the perceived electoral unimportance of low-income Canadians (Banting 2007, 156). Moreover, Canada is one of the most decentralized states in the world and the downloading of control over spending and priorities from Ottawa to the provinces under the Paul Martin and Stephen Harper governments has turned the federal government into an even weaker partner in the federation. This has allowed the politics of regionalism to thrive in Canada, leading to growing regional variation in income inequality in different parts of the country and a lack of cohesion on this issue.

Global Debate

Although the Gini coefficient has risen since the 1980s in some rich countries, such as the United States, the prevailing view for the past two decades among the world’s policy

elite has been that inequality itself was less important than improving outcomes for those at the bottom of the income distribution. Tony Blair, Britain's former Prime Minister, was perhaps one of the biggest proponents of this approach. In 2001 he rejected a call to raise the higher rate of income tax, while an MP in his party was famously quoted as saying: "We [the Labour Party] are intensely relaxed about people becoming filthy rich" (Adams 2008). In the same time period, the U.S. Congress cut taxes for the highest income earners.

However, in the wake of the global financial crisis, the debate surrounding income inequality has altered and gained in prominence. While Wall Street has been widely blamed for the recession, Hugh Mackenzie has found that it is also the rich that are rebounding the fastest from the economic slump (Mackenzie 2011). At the same time, the effects of austerity measures that will hit the poor hardest are now being fully felt. Consequently, everyone from Tony Blair's successor, Prime Minister David Cameron, to China's President Hu Jintao have expressed concerns about income inequality in society. At this year's World Economic Forum, the annual gathering of senior business figures in Davos, growing income inequality was considered to be one of the two main global risks over the next decade. According to Min Zhu, a special adviser at the International Monetary Fund and a former deputy governor of the People's Bank of China, "The increase in inequality is the most serious challenge for the world" and deserves greater attention (Conference Board of Canada 2011).

The issue might finally be reaching the tipping point in the United States as well. The focus of the economic discussion in the months preceding the onset of the Occupy Wall Street protests was on the reduction of government spending, taxes, regulations and the deficit. According to a senior White House official, there is now growing voter resentment towards the playing field being tilted so far toward the wealthy (Liasson 2011). This is the sentiment behind President Obama's populist message of asking wealthy Americans to pay more in taxes to reduce the deficit and to fund the jobs program. "Warren Buffett's secretary shouldn't pay a higher tax rate than Warren Buffett," said President Obama (Liasson 2011). In fact, Obama's plan to ensure that no household making more than

USD \$1 million per year pays a lower average tax rate than middle-class families has been dubbed the “Buffet rule” as a result of its support by America’s second richest man. While Republicans have charged that this policy proposal represents class warfare, an October 5 Washington Post/ABC News poll indicated that 75 per cent of Americans back a millionaires’ tax (Avlon 2011). Meanwhile, recent austerity budgets in France and Italy have also included taxes on the wealthy, while Britain’s Tories have faced backlash for wanting to remove a temporary “top up tax” on the top of the income bracket.

The growing prominence of income inequality on the global stage and how the problem is being tackled could have an effect on the problem definition process in Canada. On one hand, Canadian policy makers can look to how the issue has been framed by other countries as a case study to see what works, and what does not. As well, a consensus among global opinion leaders on the importance of resolving income inequality could give the issue greater credibility in Canada. However, the danger in this is that waiting for the rest of the world and the media to frame the issue will mean that Canadian policy makers might have less of an influence on public opinion. This may prove to be dangerous since the proposed solutions that work, or have broad support in other countries, might not necessarily be the right fit for Canada.

Influencing Public Opinion

There is evidence to suggest that opinion change is an important, though not sufficient factor, in policy change (Blidook 2008, 356). However, policy researchers, such as Leslie Pal, have noted that Canada’s parliamentary system tends to be more closed to outside influences than the U.S. congressional system (Pal 2010, 340). In other words, parliamentary institutions provide a more stable platform for the development and maintenance of policy priorities because the parliamentary system gives “extensive agenda-setting powers to governments by, among other things, curtailing public and media access to information” (Pal 2010, 340). In addition, Canada appears to encourage less policy entrepreneurship and Canadian philanthropists do not contribute as much money to think tanks and foundations as compared to the United States.

The media also has a role to play in this process, acting as an important conduit of the most recent policy research and ideas from think tanks to the public. Several researchers have found evidence that indicates the media's framing, or the style of issue coverage, can alter public perceptions and preferences (Blidook 2008, 357). Press releases from think tanks help them to control this process to an extent, as it gives them an opportunity to encapsulate the problem, or their reason for dealing with an issue contained in the report or study being unveiled.

A question that has been raised is the extent to which think tanks, as unelected bodies, should influence the policy discourse (Williams 2010). While think tanks are not as well established in Canada as they are either in the United States or the United Kingdom, their reports and findings still receive considerable, albeit short-lived, attention from the Canadian media. The issue remains whether they have attained a level of credibility that is necessary to use framing successfully to influence public opinion. James Druckman has found the degree of source credibility is a "clear and systematic" limit to framing (Druckman 2001, 1061). In essence, elites can influence public opinion not because of undue manipulation but "because citizens delegate to credible elites for guidance" (Druckman 2001, 1061).

One Canadian think tank that has made the income inequality one of its major projects is the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (CCPA), which is concerned with issues of social, economic and environmental justice. In a 2006 report, "Growing Gap: Growing Concerns," the CCPA noted that income inequality "is clearly an issue that's flying under the radar screen of Canadian political life" (CCPA 2006, 4). The think tank hopes that it can cure income inequality of its problem invisibility by pulling the issue "out of the dark corners of Canadian society and [setting] it right where it belongs: front and centre in Canadian public discourse" (CCPA 2006, 4).

For this purpose, the CCPA has commissioned four national polls over the last two decades to measure the Canadian public's opinion on income inequality. The most recent example is the interview conducted by Environics Research of 2,021 adult Canadians by

phone in the summer and fall of 2006, prior to the federal election. The results of this poll seemed to represent a strong call to action, with 86 per cent (61 per cent strongly and 25 per cent somewhat) of Canadians polled believing that the government should reduce the gap between the rich and poor, up from 82 per cent in 1999 (CCPA 2007, 5). Moreover, the poll findings show that the vast majority of Canadians interviewed believe that the gap between the rich and poor is growing, up by 6 per cent from 2003 to 76 per cent in 2006 (CCPA 2006, 10).

Exploring Policy Solutions

What kind of policy interventions would Canadians support to reduce income inequality? This is an important question to ask because problem definition is a strategic process in which “groups, individuals, and government agencies consciously fashion portrayals so as to promote their favoured course of action” (Pal 2011, 109). Thus, knowing what solution Canadians would be most likely to endorse will help us define the problem. Luckily, in the 2006 nationwide public opinion poll on income inequality, the CCPA also asked Canadians what they believe the government could do to reduce the nation’s growing income gap. The most popular option, with the support of nine in 10 Canadians polled, is making post-secondary education more affordable by reducing tuition and providing more grants to those in need. Increasing the minimum wage was second, while creating more affordable housing and childcare was third and fourth (CCPA 2007, 3). The two options involving taxation, support for closing tax loopholes and increasing taxes on the wealthy, received the lowest amount of support (CCPA 2007, 4).

Political Action

Despite the fact that CCPA’s report revealed strong support for political action on income inequality, just a few months prior to the 2006 federal election, the growing income gap was not the “sleeping issue” of the election as some advocates had hoped (CCPA 2006). Perhaps a part of the lack of political call to action has been due to the fact that the majority of Canadians polled, or 67 per cent, believed that social mobility was still a possibility in Canada in 2006 (CCPA 2006). Indeed, research indicates that Canada’s low-income children are less likely to remain in poverty as young adults, compared to

their American and British counterparts (Picot and Myles 2005, 28). As well, almost half of Canadians feel their standard of living has improved over the past 10 years, while 30 per cent say their circumstances are about the same, and 21 per cent say they are now worse off (CCPA 2006, 8). Whether they are worse off or not, most Canadians also tend to see themselves as middle class, with 75 per cent believing that their personal income is either above average or higher than the Canadian average (CCPA 2006, 8).

Election platforms, although not always abided by parties once they are elected, can be revealing in terms of the issues that political parties believe Canadians already do or should prioritize. Although the 2011 federal election was the fourth in less than seven years, income inequality, has yet to figure as a major electoral issue for any of Canada's three major political parties. Instead, the focus has been on relieving pressures on Canada's middle-class, in part by keeping taxes low. A similar sentiment carried the day in recent elections in both Ontario and Toronto. After all, as was seen in the CCPA opinion poll, targeting the middle-class is an effective strategy since this is where majority of Canadians believe they belong, whether their incomes actually fall into this range or not. Politicians of all stripes seem to believe that income inequality is not yet a policy issue for which middle-class voters could be mobilized to the ballot box.

If the Occupy movement fails to evolve into an effective mechanism for catalyzing political action in Canada, the danger is that income inequality might lose its current prominence on the public radar before substantive change occurs. In other words, the growing income gap in Canadian society might follow Anthony Downs' "issue attention cycle," wherein a policy problem "suddenly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then -- though still largely unresolved -- gradually fades from the center of public attention" (Downs 1972, 38).

Conclusion

The debate over income inequality has recently achieved global prominence and top Canadian officials have started to take notice. Yet the transition from the problem recognition stage to problem definition and structuring has yet to occur in a successful

manner, despite efforts by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, among others, to frame the issue as one of growing urgency for the nation. The challenge can partially be attributed the insular nature of the policy process in Canada thanks to the country's parliamentary institutions, which prevents think tanks from having as much of an influence on policy debates as compared to the U.S. or U.K. This is exacerbated by the income inequality's classification as an ill-structured problem, marked by high levels of uncertainty, as well competing objectives and alternatives (Pal 2010, 115).

While opinion polls indicate that Canadians want the government to act to address income inequality, election after election shows that voters do not yet perceive the growing income gap as a problem that can affect them directly, unlike a policy priority such as healthcare. The aim should now be to capitalize on the growing global policy consensus surrounding income inequality and to determine how the problem can be framed in such a way that solutions directed at solving it can be seen as making all of society better off. Otherwise, the issue will remain invisible not only to the federal government and provincial governments, but to the country's policy process, which in turn will lead to Canadian society becoming increasingly polarized.

References

- Adams, Tim. 2008. "The Comeback Kid: Peter Mandelson." *The Guardian*, December 21. Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2008/dec/21/peter-mandelson>.
- Avlon, John. 2011. "Millionaire's Tax is on Target." *CNNOpinion*. Accessed on November 3, 2011. <http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/10/opinion/avlon-reid-millionaire-tax/index.html>.
- Banting, Keith G. 2007. "The Three Federalisms: Social Policy and Intergovernmental Decision-Making." In *Canadian Federalism: Performance, Effectiveness, and Legitimacy*. 2nd ed. Eds. Herman Bakvis and Grace Skogstad. Toronto: Oxford University Press: 137-160.
- Blidook, Kelly. 2008. "Media, public opinion and health care in Canada: How the media affects 'The way things are.'" *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 41, (2): 355-74.
- Canadian Centre for Policy Analysis. 2006. "Growing Gap: Growing Concerns." Accessed April 1, 2011. http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2006/Growing_Gap_Growing_Concerns.pdf.
- Canadian Centre for Policy Analysis. 2007. "What Can Governments Due about Canada's Growing Gap?" Accessed April 1, 2011. http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_Office_Pubs/2007/What_

Can_Governments_Do.pdf

- Christensen, Karen. 2009. "Thought Leader Interview: Michael Spence." Rotman, Winter. Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/pdf/winter09.pdf>.
- Conference Board of Canada. 2010. "Hot Topic: World Income Inequality." Accessed November 3, 2011. <http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/hot-topics/worldInequality.aspx>.
- Cowen, Tyler. 2011. "The Inequality that Matters." *The American Interest*, January-February. Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=907>.
- Downs, Anthony. "Up and Down with Ecology – the "Issue Attention Cycle." *National Affairs* 28: 38-50.
- Druckman, Paul. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *The Journal of Politics* 63, 4 (November) 1041-66.
- Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1990. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Freeland, Chrystia. 2011. "The Rise of the New Global Elite." *The Atlantic*, January/February. Accessed April 1, 2011. <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/the-rise-of-the-new-global-elite/8343/>.
- Hulchanski, David J. 2010. *The Three Cities Within Toronto: Income Polarization Among Toronto's Neighborhoods, 1970-2005*. Toronto: Cities Centre Press, University of Toronto.
- Mackenzie, Hugh. 2011. "Recession Proof." Accessed April 1, 2011. http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_per_cent20Office/2011/01/Recession_per_cent20Proof.pdf.
- Liasson, Mara. 2011. "Income Gap Becomes Politicians' Latest Battleground." NPR. Accessed November 4, 2011. <http://www.npr.org/2011/11/04/142002704/income-gap-becomes-politicians-latest-battleground>.
- Miller, Eric. 2010. "Toronto Election 2010 Discussion Paper #11: Inequality in Toronto." <http://www.citiescentre.utoronto.ca/Assets/Cities+Centre+Digital+Assets/pdfs/publications/Inequality+in+Toronto.pdf>.
- Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. 2008. "Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD countries." http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,3343,en_2649_33933_41460917_1_1_1_1,00.html
- Pal, Leslie A. 2009. *Beyond Policy Analysis. Public Issue Management in Turbulent Times*. Toronto: Thomson Nelson. 4th Edition.
- Picot, Garnett and John Myles. 2005. "Income inequality and low income in Canada: an international perspective." *Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series*, Statistics Canada, Ottawa.
- Saez, Emmanuel and Michael R. Veall. 2005. "The Evolution of High Incomes in Northern America: Lessons from Canadian Evidence." *The American Economic Review* 95, 3 (June), 831-849.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E. 2011. "Of the 1 per cent, by the 1 per cent, for the 1 per cent." *Vanity Fair*, May. Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://www.vanityfair.com/society/features/2011/05/top-one-percent-201105?printable=true#ixzz1JJYov9t00>.

- Yakabuski, Konrad. 2009. "When Wealth Became a Character Flaw." *The Globe and Mail*, March 21. Accessed April 1, 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/commentary/when-wealth-became-a-character-flaw/article504493/page2/>.
- Yalnizyan, Armine. 2011. "Government of the 1 percent, for the 1 percent, by the 1 percent." Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://rabble.ca/blogs/bloggers/progressive-economics-forum/2011/04/government-1-cent-1-cent-1-cent>.
- Yalnizyan, Armine. 2010a. "The Rise of the Richest 1 per cent." Accessed April 1, 2011. http://www.policyalternatives.ca/sites/default/files/uploads/publications/National_per_cent20Office/2010/12/Richest_per_cent201_per_cent20Percent.pdf.
- Yalnizyan, Armine. 2010b. "We're Ignoring Inequality At Our Peril." *The Globe and Mail*, December 1. Accessed April 5, 2011. <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/economy/economy-lab/the-economists/were-ignoring-inequality-at-our-peril/article1820187/print/>.
- Yalnizyan, Armine. 2009, May. "Shaping a Future for Everyone." Accessed April 1, 2011. <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/monitor/shaping-future-everyone>.
- Williams, Zoe. 2010. "Brains for Hire: the Thinktank." *The Guardian*, October 27. Accessed April 13, 2011. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/oct/27/thinktanks-brains-for-hire>